From the user point of view, security and efficiency are the two main factors for any authentication scheme. However, most of the smart card authentication schemes are vulnerable to one or the other possible attack. In this paper, highly secured smart card authentication scheme is proposed using image encryption that resists all the possible attacks and satisfies the needs of a user. Its security is based on encryption of text with a key image. Moreover, it provides mutual authentication, session key establishment and uses date and time as a timestamp to resist replay attack. Security analysis proves that the proposed scheme is more secure and practical.
INTRODUCTION
Authentication is the process of verifying the identity of a user who wants to get access to server. In traditional password based remote user authentication schemes, server has to keep a verification table secretly in order to verify the legitimacy of a user over insecure channel. In 1981, Lamport [1] proposed a password authentication scheme to authenticate remote users. However, an intruder can penetrate the server and modify the contents of the password or verification table. In 1995, Wu [2] developed a remote login authentication scheme based on a geometric approach and claimed that the scheme eliminates the use of verification table, provides security against impersonation attack and replay attack. Nevertheless, Hwang [3] showed that Wu's scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attack. In 1999, Yang and Shieh [4] proposed an ID based scheme using RSA cryptosystem. However, Chan and Cheng [5] proved that Yang and Shieh's scheme is susceptible to impersonation attack. In 2000, Hwang and Li [6] developed a remote user authentication scheme based on ElGamal's cryptosystem and claimed that their scheme is free from replay attack and there is no need to maintain any verification table to authenticate a legitimate user. Though, Chan and Cheng [7] showed that Hwang and Li's scheme is exposed to impersonation attack. In 2000, Sun [8] proposed a remote user authentication scheme using one-way hash function. In 2003, Hsu [9] found that Sun's scheme is weak against offline and online password guessing attacks. An improved scheme was presented by Chien et al. [10] to eliminate password guessing attacks and claimed that their scheme does not require any verification table and the user can choose the password by itself. In addition, it provides mutual authentication between the remote user and the server. However, Hsu [9] showed that Chien et al.'s scheme is susceptible to parallel session attack.
In 2004, Juang [11] proposed a nonce based scheme to solve time synchronization problem and claimed that the scheme has an additional merit of session key generation. Nevertheless, this scheme is weak against insider attack and user is not allowed to change the password freely. In 2004, Das et al. [12] developed a dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme using one way hash function. The authors claimed that their scheme allows users to choose and change the passwords freely. Moreover, it provides security against ID theft and resists forgery attack, replay attack, insider attack, stolen verifier attack and guessing attack. In 2005, Liao et al. [13] found that Das et al.'s scheme is weak against guessing attack, insider attack and fails to provide mutual authentication. An improved scheme was also developed to preclude these weaknesses. In 2009, Wang et al. [14] demonstrated that Das et al.'s scheme is password independent and further improvement was also suggested. In 2010, Song [15] presented an efficient smart card authentication scheme based on symmetric key cryptography and claimed that the scheme provides security against impersonation attack, parallel session attack, replay attack and modification attack.
Moreover, it provides mutual authentication and shared session key. Though, Pippal et al. [16] showed that Song's scheme is inadequate to withstand Denial-of-Service attack and provide perfect forward secrecy. In 2010, Li and Hwang [17] proposed a biometrics based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. The security of Li and Hwang's scheme relies on the one-way hash function, smart card and biometrics verification. They claimed that their scheme provides mutual authentication, does not require synchronized clocks between users and the remote server, the users change their passwords freely and resists replay attack, parallel session attack and impersonation attack. In 2011, Li et al. [18] found that Li and Hwang's scheme does not provide proper authentication and fails to resist the man-in-the-middle attack. An improved scheme was also developed to prohibit these security pitfalls. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The proposed smart card authentication scheme using image encryption is described in section 2. Section 3 demonstrates the results and security analysis of the proposed scheme. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper.
PROPOSEDSMART CARD AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
Steganography is an art and science of information hiding and invisible communication. Hiding information inside images is a popular technique nowadays. This work satisfies the aim that says 'Steganography' is an effective way to obscure data and hide sensitive information. Today, information security is
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becoming more vital in transmission and data storage. Due to this, images are widely used in many applications. In the field of information hiding, image encryption plays a significant part. Several image encryption techniques have been proposed to hide the data inside an image. However, most of these schemes have their pros and cons. The principal idea behind the used image encryption technique is that two pictures are used to calculate differences between their pixels, which are converted into UTF char code (text). The UTF char code is distributed randomly between the R, G and B which are added or subtracted from the original RGB. Here, the first pixel behaves like a flag pixel and the decrypter decrypts the received image by calculating the distance between each received data-pixel. It, then, starts to read the picture. This section describes the proposed smart card authentication scheme using image encryption. The notations used throughout this article are summarized as follows 
Initial Phase
Server selects two large prime numbers p and q such that p = 2q + 1, chooses its secret key "x" in Z q , a one-way hash function h(·), image encryption E(·) and decryption D(·) operations and a key image I 1 . The server keeps p, x and I 1 secret.
Registration Phase
This phase is invoked whenever user U A initially registers to the authentication server S. User U A selects ID A , PW A , computes h(PW A ) and submits {ID A , h(PW A )} to the server. Upon receiving the registration request, server computes C A = h(ID A x mod p), B A = C A  h(PW A ) and issues a smart card to user U A by storing {ID A , B A , C A , h(·), E(·), D(·), I 1 } into smart card memory. It is assumed that the data stored in the smart card is secure and no one can extract it from smart card memory.
Login Phase
User U A inserts the smart card to the card reader and keys in 
Authentication Phase
Upon 
Password Change Phase
This phase is invoked when user U A wants to change the password. User U A inserts the smart card to the card reader and keys in ID A 
RESULTS AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
This work has been implemented on Windows XP2, Pentium 4 CPU 2.80 GHz using Java1.6. Fig. 2 shows the key image I 1 , Image I 2 = E(I 1 , ID A ║D A ║Q A ║T A ) is the login request parameter and Image I 3 = E(I 1 , ID A ║D S ║T S ) is the parameter contained in response message transmitted from the server to user for mutual authentication.
As the contents of all the communicating messages exchanged between user and server are encrypted with the key image I 1 , no one can extract these contents from an eavesdropped image. Even if, an attacker gets the contents of all the communicating messages, the proposed scheme resists the following attacks:
Impersonation Attack
In the proposed scheme, the login request contains {ID A , T A , I 2 } where I 2 = E(I 1 , ID A ║D A ║Q A ║T A ). Suppose an attacker has derived the text ID A ║D A ║Q A ║T A from the image I 2 . To modify D A and Q A , the attacker needs to guess the correct values of R A and C A . Hence, attacker is unable to create a forged login request to impersonate a valid user.
Password Guessing Attack
Since h(PW i ) is used only in the verification of computed C A ' which is not a part of login request, this scheme is secure against password guessing attack.
Replay Attack
This scheme uses date and time as a timestamp. Thus, attackers cannot enter the system by resending messages previously transmitted by legal users. 
Impersonation Attack
Password Guessing Attack
Replay Attack
This scheme uses date and time as a timestamp. Thus, attackers cannot enter the system by resending messages previously transmitted by legal users.
Reflection and Parallel Session Attack
To resist reflection and parallel session attacks, the scheme employs asymmetric computations of parameter values of communicating messages, i.e., {ID A , T A , I 2 } and {ID A , T S , I 3 }, where I 2 = E(I 1 , ID A ║D A ║Q A ║T A ) and I 3 = E(I 1 , ID A ║D S ║T S ).
Insider Attack
During the registration phase, h(PW i ) is sent to server S as an alternative of PW i . So, any insider of S cannot get user password PW i . Hence, this scheme is secure against insider attack.
Stolen Verifier Attack
The server does not maintain any password or verification table to verify the user's login request. Therefore, the scheme withstands stolen verifier attack. 
Smart Card Loss Attack
If a user U i 's smart card is lost or stolen, no one can impersonate the smart card owner to login the server. Without knowing the correct ID i and PW i of the user, attacker cannot prepare a valid login request.
3.11
User can choose and change the password securely without any assistance from the server
In the scheme, the smart card verifies the old password first in the password change phase. So, unauthorized users cannot change the authorized user's password even if they get the corresponding smart card.
The scheme provides session key generation
The proposed scheme generates a session key SKey = h(ID A ║D A ║D S ║R A ) during the authentication phase which will be different for each login session.
Attack on Perfect Forward Secrecy
In the scheme, the session key SK = h(D i ║N i ║N j ║B i ') is calculated using randomly generated nonces N i and N j which are different for each login session and are not a part of any of the transmitted messages between user U i and the server S. Even if an attacker gets X s , server's secret key, there is no way to get any information about present session key or previous session keys. Hence, the scheme provides perfect forward secrecy.
Denning-Sacco Attack
If an attacker captures a session key then there is no way to get any information about nonces N i and N j or server"s secret key X s due to the property of one-way hash. As PW i is not involved directly in the calculation of session key, no one can get user"s password from the eavesdropped session key.
Denial-of-Service Attack
If the user U i inputs a wrong password by mistake, this password will be quickly detected by the card reader since reader compares B i ' = A i  h(ID i '║h(PW i ')) with the stored B i during the login phase. Hence, the scheme resists this type of Denial-of-Service attack.
Man-in-the-Middle Attack
In the proposed scheme, if an attacker intercepts the communicating messages between the user and the server then it will not generate any useful information because nonces N i and N j (used in the calculation of session key) are not a part of the communicating messages. Moreover, to alter Z i or Z j , one needs the value of A i . Hence, the proposed scheme resists man-in-the-middle attack.
CONCLUSION
This paper describes a highly secured smart card authentication scheme using image encryption. It has been shown that the proposed scheme provides stronger security as it prevents impersonation attack, password guessing attack, replay attack, insider attack, reflection attack, parallel session attack, stolen verifier attack, smart card loss attack, Denial-ofService attack, attack on perfect forward secrecy and denningsacco attack. Moreover, the proposed scheme offers the following properties: user can choose and change the password without any help from the server, provides mutual authentication and session key generation.
